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Abstract
In the context of an infinitely repeated oligopoly game, we study (optimal) collusion
among firms that have both price and quantity as a strategic choice variable. We consider
two modes of production: production in advance and production to order. For both
types of industry, we compare a price cartel with a price-quota cartel and analyze if and
under what conditions firms prefer the latter to the former. We find three main results.
First, when production is in advance of sales and market demand is relatively elastic,
an additional agreement on outputs may be required to solve coordination and incentive
problems. Second, if production is in advance of sales and market demand is relatively
inelastic, then a price-quota cartel is always more profitable than a price cartel. Finally,
with production to order, collusion may not be sustainable without a quota agreement.
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1 Introduction
“The Cournot story concerns producers who simultaneously and independently
make production quantity decisions, and who then bring what they have produced
to the market, with the market price being the price that equates the total supply
with demand. The Bertrand story, on the other hand, concerns producers who
simultaneously and independently name prices. Demand is allocated to the low-
price producer(s), who then produce (up to) the demand they encounter . . . There
are two differences in these stories: how price is determined (by an auctioneer
in Cournot and by price “competition” in Bertrand), and when production is
supposed to take place.”(Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), p. 326.)
Both the Cournot and the Bertrand story have significantly enhanced our understanding of
strategic firm behavior in oligopolies. Yet, both have also been subject to severe criticism.
For instance, Cournot’s model requires an auctioneer to determine the market price, whereas
in practice prices are typically set by suppliers themselves. In this respect, Bertrand’s story
is more satisfactory. However, this model assumes that production follows the realization
of demand, whereas in a great many industries production precedes sales. More generally,
and independent of the timing of production, it seems more reasonable to assume that firms
choose both their prices and production levels. This is true when producers compete, but no
different when they collude.
The objective of this paper is to study (optimal) collusion among firms that have both
price and quantity as a strategic choice variable. Towards that end, we analyze an infinitely
repeated oligopoly game in which firms simultaneously make both price and production de-
cisions in each period. We consider two modes of production: production in advance and
production to order. With production in advance, production costs are incurred before a firm
learns how much it will actually sell. By contrast, when production is to order, producers
choose a price and a quantity that they are willing to sell at that price. Thus, the key differ-
ence between both settings lies in whether or not firms commit to a particular production level
before the realization of demand. We therefore incorporate the Cournot and Bertrand story
regarding the timing of production, but price decisions are made by the producers themselves
(i.e., there is no auctioneer).
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In attempting to combine the more plausible elements of both stories, existing literature
has primarily focused on settings in which firms first choose production capacities and then
engage in price competition. The reason for analyzing price competition given capacities is
that prices can presumably be adjusted more quickly than quantity-related variables. For
example, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) finds that Bertrand competition may yield Cournot
outcomes when suppliers first choose a scale of operation. As to collusion, Fershtman and
Muller (1986) explores the impact of long-run competition in capital investments on collusion
on prices and market shares and shows, among other things, that competition in capacities
has no destabilizing effect on collusion. Benoit and Krishna (1987) finds that when firms are
allowed to collude on both price and capacity then all collusive equilibria have firms hold-
ing excess capacity. Davidson and Deneckere (1990) establishes that more collusion requires
higher levels of excess capacity. Holding excess capacity is required to enforce a collusive
scheme as it allows to punish a deviator by increasing production. In the current paper, we
assume that firms adopt grim-trigger strategies to sustain collusion and that there is sufficient
production capacity to implement this punishment strategy. Consequently, our focus is on
actual output decisions and not on the maximum amount of products a firm can offer each
period.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to study collusion in a price-quantity oligopoly
while taking account of different timing of production.1 As suppliers have control over both
price and quantity, one question of interest is what choice variables they will optimally collude
on. Will they choose to collude on price or quantity (semicollusion) or both (full collusion)?2
In this study, we restrict attention to price collusion and price-quantity collusion. Put dif-
ferently, firms are given the possibility to either form a price-fixing cartel or a price-quota
cartel.3 Clearly, as full collusion allows firms to mimic semicollusion, full collusion in prin-
ciple generates (weakly) higher profits. Yet, there are at least three reasons why firms may
prefer to collude on a limited number of choice variables. First, reaching consensus on the
coordination of an additional variable complicates the bargaining process and there is plenty
of evidence from practice that bargaining issues can significantly disturb the formation of a
1Contributions that consider competition in price-quantity oligopolies include, for example, Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983), Friedman (1988), Dixon (1992) and Tasna´di (2006).
2For a recent survey of literature on semicollusion, see Steen and Sørgard (2009).
3In this study, whenever we use the term (sales) quota(s), we mean an allocation of quantities or market
shares.
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cartel. Second, coordinating on more variables may complicate enforcement as more monitor-
ing is required to ensure compliance. Third, more complete cartel contracts leave additional
traces of evidence and therefore, ceteris paribus, increase the probability of conviction. In
short, if a price cartel and a price-quota cartel are more or less equally successful, then firms
are likely not to install an additional quota agreement. For both modes of production, we first
analyze optimal price collusion and then evaluate the potential additional value of a quota
agreement.
The analysis in this study thus sheds some light on one particular type of cartel hetero-
geneity: why do some cartels entail an agreement on both prices and quantities, whereas
others include only an arrangement on prices? For example, in Carbonless Paper members
agreed on the timing and magnitude of price increases for each EEA country.4 However,
these price-fixing agreements were only sometimes accompanied by quota agreements (e.g.,
in Spain and France). In Elevators and Escalators members coordinated prices and allocated
projects on the basis of a pre-arranged market share scheme.5 In particular, a compensation
mechanism was adopted to ensure alignment of overall project value with the allocated shares.
Yet, in the Netherlands the cartel operated on a project by project basis seemingly without
a clear compensation scheme. In Methionine parties fixed minimum and target prices and
agreed on concerted price increases.6 One of the members proposed a volume control scheme
including a compensation mechanism, but sales quotas were never implemented. There are
many more real-world examples of price and price-quota cartels.7
We find that firms almost always prefer to install a price-quota cartel when production is
in advance of sales. However, the reasons for adopting a market sharing scheme in addition to
a price-fixing agreement differ. When market demand is relatively elastic, firms will optimally
set the monopoly price. In this case, an arrangement on outputs allows firms to deal with
both coordination and incentive problems.8 The coordination problem concerns the fact that
in equilibrium every member should have a sufficiently high level of sales, while ensuring that
4Case COMP/E-1/36.212 - Carbonless paper.
5Case COMP/E-1/38.823 - PO/Elevators and Escalators.
6Case C.37.519 - Methionine.
7See, for instance, Russo, Schinkel, Gu¨nster and Carree (2010). This book provides a complete overview
and description of all European cartel cases between 1962 and 2009.
8Osborne (1976) identifies four internal problems a cartel may be confronted with. The cartel has to locate
the contract surface and choose a point on that surface (the coordination problem). Additionally, it has to
detect and deter cheating (the incentive problem).
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the market clears. The incentive problem prescribes the cartel to allocate a sufficiently large
part of total sales to the smallest members as they appear to have the strongest incentive
to defect from the agreement. Therefore, given that the size distribution of members is suf-
ficiently heterogeneous, a price-quota cartel is ceteris paribus more likely than a price-fixing
cartel. If market demand is relatively inelastic, then the coordination problem is absent.
The reason being that in this case all members optimally produce identical amounts. Yet,
sustainability of collusion requires the cartel to set a price below the monopoly price in order
to mitigate incentives to defect. In this case, a price-quota cartel is found to be always more
profitable than a price-fixing cartel. Specifically, installing an optimal market sharing scheme
allows firms to avoid overproduction and to sustain the joint profit maximum.
By contrast, overproduction does not occur in equilibrium when production follows the
realization of demand. Moreover, for both price collusion and price-quantity collusion, the
profit-maximizing cartel price is the monopoly price. In this case, an additional quota agree-
ment is made solely when a price cartel alone is not sustainable. As with production in
advance, the smallest members have the strongest incentive to deviate from the cartel agree-
ment. Hence, sustainability of collusion may require a redistribution of sales from the larger
to the smaller cartel participants. Overall, our study suggests that a price-quota cartel is
likely to be the rule rather than the exception. An additional quota agreement may not have
added value when firms produce to order and are more or less of equal size.
We believe one should be reluctant to bring up evidence from antitrust practice to support
general theoretical predictions of cartel behavior like ours. One reason for this is that known
cartels differed in many respects. Moreover, they have been operating in a wide variety of
industries and had to deal with specific problems. As a result, there are potentially many
explanations for observed collusive conduct. Apart from this, relevant information that is
required to confidently match a general theoretical framework with a specific cartel case is
often lacking. However, in this respect the lysine cartel forms a notable exception. This
cartel is one of the most well-documented cases in antitrust history and of particular interest
to our study as it had two “lives”.9 During its first life, members fixed prices but no market
sharing scheme was adopted. During its second life, members also agreed on a market share
allocation. The market for lysine is characterized by homogeneous products, approximately
9See, for instance, Connor (2001) and de Roos (2006).
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constant unit production costs and relatively inelastic market demand. In this case, our
model would predict firms to prefer a price-quota cartel as it allows them to sustain higher
prices. This is indeed what happened. That is, the cartel set prices at a significantly higher
level during its second life, which was generally more successful. Therefore, there exists some
support for our theoretical findings in antitrust practice.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 3
describes the stationary equilibria in markets where production is in advance of sales. The
cartel’s problem is presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides an analysis of price- and price-
quantity collusion when production precedes sales. Section 6 describes the stationary equi-
libria and provides an analysis of price- and price-quantity collusion when firms produce to
order. Section 7 relates our main findings to existing literature that considers cost hetero-
geneity, private information and demand uncertainty. Moreover, we evaluate the potential
impact of strategic inventories. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a homogeneous good industry in which a fixed and finite set of firms, denoted by
N = {1, . . . , n}, interact repeatedly over an infinite, discrete time horizon. In this section, we
present the assumptions used in analyzing the stage game. Assumptions regarding collusive
conduct are introduced in Section 4.
Firms simultaneously make price and production decisions so as to maximize their ex-
pected profit. A ≡ [0, a] × [0, b] is the common action set and price and quantity choices
are respectively denoted by the vectors p ≡ (p1, . . . , pn) and q ≡ (q1, . . . , qn), where pi ∈
[0, a] and qi ∈ [0, b] for all i ∈ N . Define p−i ≡ (p1, ..., pi−1, pi+1, ..., pn) and q−i ≡
(q1, ..., qi−1, qi+1, ..., qn) as, respectively, the vector of prices and quantities of all firms other
than i. Firms have identical unit production costs c ∈ (0, a) and sufficient production capacity
available (i.e., there are no capacity constraints).
Market demand is given by D(p), which is a continuous, strictly decreasing and concave
function of price in the range [0, a]. Additionally, we assume that this function is identically
zero on [a,∞), twice continuously differentiable on (0, a) and D(0) < b.10 The monopoly
10As described below, we assume a proportional demand allocation rule. The reason for assuming D(0) < b
is that with such a rule firms potentially have an incentive to produce in excess of D(0). It can be easily
verified that there always exists an upper bound on the amount a firm is willing to produce.
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price and output are respectively indicated by pm and qm: D(pm) + (pm − c)D′(pm) = 0 and
qm = D(pm).
Demand for the products of firm i is denoted Di(pi, qi,p−i,q−i). For any price-quantity
configuration, its profit is then given by
pii(pi, qi,p−i,q−i) = piDi(pi, qi,p−i,q−i)− cqi. (1)
Consumers buy first from a supplier charging the lowest price. In specifying firm i’s demand,
define ∆(pi) ≡ {j ∈ N : pj < pi} and Ω(pi) ≡ {j ∈ N : pj = pi} as the set of firms that
respectively price below and at pi.
11
With production in advance, production takes place before the realization of demand.
Thus, a firm learns about prices and production levels of its rivals after it has produced
and set the price for its own products. We suppose that in this case demand is established
according to a proportional demand allocation rule. If two or more firms charge the same
price and total supply exceeds total demand at that price, then sales are assumed proportional
to individual levels of production. Firm i’s part of (residual) demand at that price is denoted
by λi.
12
Assumption 1. Assume production in advance. λi =
qi∑
j∈Ω(pi) qj
, for all i ∈ N .
Consequently, suppliers with more products available receive a larger share of market demand,
all else unchanged.13 Firm i’s demand is then of the following structure:
Di(pi, qi,p−i,q−i) = min{qi, λi(D(pi)−
∑
k∈∆(pi) qk)
+}.
3 Static Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the (single-shot) Nash equilibrium of the model described
above. If production precedes sales, then there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. However,
we will show that there does exist a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for which
expected profits amount to zero.
11Formally, it is ∆(pi,p−i) and Ω(pi,p−i). From the context, it will be clear what p−i is. We use shorthand
notation to stress which value of pi these sets are based on.
12We use λi rather than λi(p,q) as p and q follow directly from the context.
13Assumption 1 is primarily made for ease of analysis. The findings in this paper are robust against alter-
native allocation rules as long as the game is symmetric and a firm’s share of demand depends positively on
its own level of production.
7
Suppose that production is in advance of sales. The next result establishes that in this
case there exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Yet, we can apply Corollary 5.3 of Reny
(1999) to establish the existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Assume production in advance.
(i) There exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
(ii) There exists a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Unfortunately, in the current setting it is difficult if not impossible to determine this mixed-
strategy equilibrium explicitly. However, we are able to prove that (expected) equilibrium
profits are zero. Below, we provide a generalized version of the analysis presented in Tasna´di
(2004), which obtains a similar result for a duopoly.
For the ensuing analysis it can be easily verified that firms will never find it optimal to
price below c or above pm while supplying strictly positive quantities. We therefore focus on
the case where suppliers choose their actions simultaneously from S = [c, pm]× [0, b]. In the
following, let the space of all (Borel) probability measures on S be given by P (S) and let
µi ∈ P (S) denote a mixed strategy of firm i ∈ N . Let µ−i denote the mixed strategies of all
firms other then firm i, i.e., µ−i = (µ1, ..., µi−1, µi+1, ..., µn) and µ = (µi,µ−i). The profit
of firm i, when µ is the joint strategy, is given by pii(µ). A mixed-strategy equilibrium µ
∗ is
then defined by the following condition:
pii(µi,µ
∗
−i) ≤ pii(µ∗i ,µ∗−i) for all i ∈ N and µi ∈ P (S).
As we consider a symmetric situation and search for a symmetric equilibrium, we indicate
a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium and corresponding equilibrium profits of a single firm
respectively by µ and pi∗ for ease of notation. The support of µ is denoted by supp(µ) and,
for any price p ∈ [c, pm], s(p) ⊆ [0, b] is the set of quantities q ∈ [0, b] for which (p, q) ∈ supp(µ).
Moreover, let µp be the projection of probability measure µ to the set of prices, i.e., µp(B) =
µ(B × [0, b]) for any Borel set B ⊆ [c, pm]. Finally, let sup{p ∈ [c, pm] | µp([p, pm]) = 1} and
inf{p ∈ [c, pm] | µp([c, p]) = 1} be respectively denoted by pˇ and pˆ.
Clearly, if pˇ = c, then pi∗ = 0. In the next two lemmas, we consider the case where pˇ > c.
Lemma 3. If pˇ > c, then s(pˇ) = {D(pˇ)} and µp({pˇ}) = 0.
That is, a firm that sets pˇ > c optimally produces to meet demand at this price. The next
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lemma shows that producing to serve the entire market may also be optimal for prices that
are above pˇ.
Lemma 4. If pˇ > c, then there exists a price p′ ∈ (pˇ, pm] such that s(p) = {D(p)} and
µp({p}) = 0 for all p ∈ [pˇ, p′].
Finally, we use this result to establish that the infimum of all prices in the support cannot be
strictly above c. As a result, all firms make zero expected profits in equilibrium.
Theorem 5. Assume production in advance. pˇ = c and pi∗ = 0.
4 Cartel’s Problem
Our next step is to analyze the incentives of firms to establish a particular cartel contract.
Towards that end, we consider the infinitely repeated version of the game described in Section
2. In every period t ∈ N, firms simultaneously make price and production decisions so as to
maximize the expected discounted sum of their profit stream, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common
discount factor. In each period t, the price and quantity choices of all firms up to t − 1 are
common knowledge.
We assume that holding inventories is sufficiently costly so that firms do not find it in
their interest to store unsold products.
Assumption 6. Firms do not build inventories.
As will become clear in the ensuing analysis, this assumption is innocuous with production to
order as in that case it is never optimal to produce more (or less) than is demanded. However,
supply may exceed demand in equilibrium when production is in advance of sale. Although
this assumption clearly comes with a price in terms of generality, it is required to keep the
analysis tractable. Consequently, our findings related to collusion with production in advance
primarily apply to industries selling perishable or fashionable goods. In Section 7.2 below, we
elaborate on the theoretical difficulty one encounters when analyzing production in advance
in repeated games. In that section, we will also argue that the qualitative nature of most of
our findings are robust to the possibility of holding (strategic) inventories.
In the previous section, we found an equilibrium in the stationary setting. If we talk
about competition in the infinitely repeated stage game, we refer to a situation in which all
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firms use strategies in which they do not use past-play or timing of current play to decide
upon their current actions. Thus, the only subgame perfect equilibrium in competition is the
equilibrium in which the (symmetric) stationary outcome prevails every period.
To prevent that from happening, firms can form a collusive agreement. In forming a
collusive agreement, firms can choose between two types of cartels: a price cartel and a price-
quota cartel. For both cases, we consider an all-inclusive cartel in which all suppliers agree
on a common cartel price pc ∈ (c, pm]. The key difference between the two types of contracts
is that with a price cartel firms are free to choose their level of production, whereas a price-
quota cartel additionally specifies the level and allocation of outputs. The agreed upon quota
in a price-quota cartel for firm i is expressed by qci . We require collusive arrangements to
be a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game and it is assumed that firms adopt
grim-trigger strategies to sustain collusion.14
This results in the following formal definitions of a price cartel strategy and a price-quota
cartel strategy. Define qi(t) as the quantity that firm i ∈ N chooses in period t. Let
Q = {q ∈ [0, b] | arg max
q
pii(p
c, (q,q−i)) for some q−i ∈ [0, b]n−1}.
A strategy profile is a price cartel if there is a price pc ∈ (0, pm] and a sequence qi(1), qi(2), ...
with qi(t) ∈ Q for each firm i at all t, such that each firm i plays as follows:
- In period 1: set price pc and quantity qi(1);
- In each period T > 1: set price pc and quantity qi(T ) if all firms have set prices equal to p
c
at all t < T , and play according to the static equilibrium strategy µ∗i otherwise.
A strategy profile is a price-quota cartel if there is a price pc ∈ (0, pm] and a quantity qci ∈ [0, b]
for each firm i, such that each firm i plays as follows:
- In period 1: set price pc and quantity qci ;
- In each period T > 1: set price pc and quantity qci if all firms j ∈ N have set prices equal to
pc and quantities equal to their individual quantity qcj at all t < T , and play according
to the static equilibrium strategy µ∗i otherwise.
14Notice that this is the most severe punishment strategy in our setting as profits in competition are zero.
Therefore, if collusion is not sustainable by adopting this strategy, then collusion will not occur in any subgame
perfect equilibrium.
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To begin, let us focus on a price cartel with a constant output configuration. In this case,
the collusive value for firm i is recursively defined by
Vi(p
c,q) = pcDi(p
c,q)− cqi + δVi(pc,q). (2)
Rearranging gives,
Vi(p
c,q) =
pcDi(p
c,q)− cqi
1− δ . (3)
As customers buy first from the cheapest supplier, maximum profit that can be earned by
defecting from the cartel agreement is obtained by undercutting the cartel price slightly and
producing to meet market demand at that price. Notice that this holds for all members of
a price- or a price-quota cartel. Consequently, given a particular cartel price pc, the optimal
defection profit always amounts to (pc− c)D(pc). Whether all price-fixing cartels indeed have
constant output configurations will be analyzed in the next sections.
As shown in the previous section, competitive behavior yields zero (expected) profits. The
incentive compatibility constraint of firm i is therefore given by
pcDi(p
c,q)− cqi
1− δ ≥ (p
c − c)D(pc), (4)
or
δ ≥ δ∗i = 1−
pcDi(p
c,q)− cqi
(pc − c)D(pc) , for all i ∈ N. (5)
As is well-known, there may exist a plethora of sustainable cartel contracts. Yet, as we require
collusion to be subgame perfect and pc > c, all these collusive arrangements have in common
that total cartel supply will not fall short of market demand. If it did, then there would be at
least one firm that would benefit from increasing its production. As a result, firm demand is
given by Di(p
c,q) = qi∑
j∈Ω(pc) qj
D(pc). In turn, this implies that all firms agree to set a cartel
price that maximizes total cartel value.
A price cartel thus faces the following constraint optimization problem:
max
p
V (p,q) = max
p
pD(p)− c∑j∈N qj
1− δ ,
subject to
pDi(p,q)− cqi − (1− δ)(p− c)D(p) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N,∑
j∈N
qj ≥ D(p).
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The key question is then if and how firms can benefit from an additional quota agreement.
In the following, we analyze this issue in more detail for markets that are respectively char-
acterized by production in advance (Section 5) and production to order (Section 6).
5 Collusion with Production in Advance
5.1 Price Cartel
Suppose that the cartel prices at pc ∈ (c, pm] and that production is in advance of sale. In the
following, we start by considering a price cartel and then analyze if and under which conditions
firms would prefer to establish a price-quota cartel instead. As a price cartel does not include
an agreement on sales, all members are unrestricted in their choice of output. That is to say,
every firm can individually decide on its production level without having to fear retaliation
from its rivals. Consequently, a cartel member produces to maximize current profit given the
output choices of its fellow members. The production level that maximizes firm i’s current
profit, given the output choices of the other participants, is denoted q∗i (p
c,q−i).
The next result specifies the optimal production decision at a given cartel price.
Lemma 7. Assume production in advance and a price cartel with common cartel price
pc ∈ (c, pm]. For all i ∈ N , the best reply production choice q∗i (pc,q−i) is given by:
q∗i (p
c,q−i) =

D(pc)−∑j∈N\{i} qj if ∑j∈N\{i} qj ≤ D(pc)c/pc√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} qj)
c −
∑
j∈N\{i} qj if D(p
c)c/pc <
∑
j∈N\{i} qj ≤ D(pc)pc/c
0 if
∑
j∈N\{i} qj > D(p
c)pc/c.
Observe that the first in combination with the second or the third optimal response cannot
occur in equilibrium. Likewise, we can exclude the possibility that in equilibrium some firms
adopt the middle best response and some firms produce nothing. To see this, notice that in this
case it must hold that
∑
i∈N qi =
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} qj)
c and
∑
j∈N\{i} qj ≤ D(pc)pc/c. This
implies
∑
i∈N qi ≤
√
pcD(pc)(D(pc)pc/c)
c = D(p
c)pc/c. If a firm would produce nothing, then∑
j∈N\{i} qj ≤ D(pc)pc/c. Yet, zero production is only a best response when
∑
j∈N\{i} qj >
D(pc)pc/c; a contradiction. This leaves two possibilities that can occur in equilibrium. Either,
all firms produce according to the first best response (i.e.,
∑
i∈N qi = D(p
c)), or all firms set
their outputs such that
∑
i∈N qi =
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} qj)
c . In the latter case, total supply
exceeds market demand.
The next result shows that, in the event of overproduction, all firms produce the same
12
quantity.
Lemma 8. If q∗v(pc,q−v) =
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{v} qj)
c −
∑
j∈N\{v} qj and q
∗
w(p
c,q−w) =
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{w} qj)
c −∑
j∈N\{w} qj, then q
∗
v(p
c,q−v) = q∗w(pc,q−w) for all v, w ∈ N .
The previous two findings are useful in characterizing the set of subgame perfect equilibria.
It appears that equilibrium production decisions in part depend on the level of the cartel price.
Theorem 9. Assume production in advance. If a price cartel (pc,q∗) is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, then for all i ∈ N,
(i) pc ≤ cnn−1 , q∗i (pc,q−i) = D(pc)−
∑
j∈N\{i} q
∗
j (p
c,q−j) and q∗i (p
c,q−i) ≥ (p
c−c
pc )D(p
c),
(ii) pc > cnn−1 and q
∗
i (p
c,q−i) =
(n−1)pcD(pc)
cn2
.
Thus, in equilibrium, the collusive value for firm i is given by
Vi(p
c,q∗) =

(pc−c)(D(pc)−∑j∈N\{i} q∗j (pc,q−j))
1−δ for p
c ≤ cnn−1 and q∗i (pc,q−i) ≥
(p
c−c
pc )D(p
c) for all i ∈ N, or
pcD(pc)
(1−δ)n2 for p
c > cnn−1 and q
∗
i (p
c,q−i) =
(n−1)pcD(pc)
cn2
for all i ∈ N.
The next issue is to find the price that maximizes the total cartel value. Following Theorem
9, we can distinguish two cases. First, if the cartel sets a price p ≤ cnn−1 , then q∗i (p,q−i) =
D(p)−∑j∈N\{i} q∗j (p,q−j) for all i ∈ N . Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint as
given by (5) reduces to
δ ≥ δˆ∗i = 1−
q∗i (p,q−i)∑
j∈N q
∗
j (p,q−j)
, for all i ∈ N, (6)
which does not directly depend on the cartel price. As a result, if pm ≤ cnn−1 , then the cartel
optimally sets the monopoly price. Note that, since maxi∈N δˆ∗i ≥ 1 − 1n , this can only occur
if δ ≥ 1− 1n .
Second, all cartel participants optimally produce q∗(p) = (n−1)pD(p)
cn2
at any price p > cnn−1 .
In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint as given by (5) is therefore given by
δ ≥ δ˜∗(p) = 1− p
n2(p− c) , (7)
which is the same for all firms and directly depends on price. In fact, δ˜∗(p) is an increasing and
concave function of p and, since δ˜∗( cnn−1) = 1− 1n , also this incentive compatibility constraint
can only hold as long as δ ≥ 1− 1n .
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Given that the cartel price exceeds cnn−1 , define p
∗ as the unconstrained solution of the cartel
problem:
dV (p,q∗(p))
dp
=
pD′(p) +D(p)
(1− δ)n2 = 0. (8)
Thus, p∗ solves p∗D′(p∗) + D(p∗) = 0 and therefore pm > p∗. Additionally, define p˜ as the
constrained solution, i.e., δ = 1− p˜
n2(p˜−c) .
Using the foregoing analysis, the next Proposition summarizes the optimal pricing decision
of a price-fixing cartel.
Proposition 10. Assume production in advance and δ ≥ 1− 1n . The optimal cartel price pc
is specified as follows:
1. Suppose pm ≤ cnn−1 .
(a) If δ ≥ δˆ∗i for all i ∈ N, then pc = pm.
2. Suppose pm > cnn−1 .
(a) If p∗ < cnn−1 , then p
c = cnn−1 .
(b) If δ < δ˜∗(p∗) and p∗ ≥ cnn−1 , then pc = p˜.
(c) If δ ≥ δ˜∗(p∗) and p∗ ≥ cnn−1 , then pc = p∗.
These four scenarios are illustrated in Figure 1 below (where δˆ ≡ max{δˆ∗1 , . . . , δˆ∗n}).
-
δ1− 1n δˆ
6p
p∗
pm
cn
n−1
pc
(1a)
-
δ1− 1n
6p
p∗
c n
n−1
pm
pc
(2a)
-
δ1− 1n δ˜∗(p∗)
6p
c n
n−1
p∗
pm
pc
(2b–c)
Figure 1: Optimal pricing decision of a price cartel when production precedes sales.
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5.2 Price-Quota Cartel
Above, we have characterized the optimal collusive strategy for a price-fixing cartel. The
remaining issue is to analyze if and how suppliers could benefit from an additional quota
agreement. In the following, we show that there are at least three arguments in favor of a
price-quota cartel when production is in advance of sales.
First, if pc ≤ cnn−1 , then by Theorem 9 production levels must be such that q∗i (pc,q−i) =
D(pc) −∑j∈N\{i} q∗j and q∗i (pc,q−i) ≥ (pc−cpc )D(pc). Thus, the market should clear while
ensuring that every cartel participant has a sufficiently high level of sales. Combining both
these requirements yields the following rather striking result.
Corollary 11. Assume production in advance and pc ≤ cnn−1 . The market share of every
cartel member must (weakly) exceed the Lerner index.
A price cartel therefore faces a coordination problem when it prices at pc < cnn−1 and this
holds true for pm < cnn−1 .
15 As in this case there seems to be no natural division of outputs,
an explicit arrangement on market shares may be required to solve this coordination problem.
In addition, a quota agreement may also be needed to solve the incentive problem when
pm ≤ cnn−1 . Observe that the minimum critical discount factor is always weakly larger than
1 − 1n , which is obtained with an equal division of sales. We therefore conclude that there
exists no viable cartel when δ < 1− 1n . Yet, given that δ ≥ 1− 1n , viability of a cartel may still
require a market sharing scheme to prevent the smallest member(s) from leaving the ring.
Theorem 12. Assume production in advance, δ ≥ 1− 1n and pm ≤ cnn−1 .
(i) If 1 − 1n ≤ δ < 1 −
q∗i (p
c,q−i)∑
j∈N q
∗
j (p
c,q−j)
for some firm i ∈ N , then there exists only a viable
price-quota cartel, and
(ii) If 1 − q∗i (pc,q−i)∑
j∈N q
∗
j (p
c,q−j)
≤ δ for all i ∈ N , then there exists both a viable price cartel and a
price-quota cartel.
Finally, if pm > cnn−1 , then Proposition 10 reveals that a price-fixing cartel is feasible.
Moreover, in this case firms have no coordination problem as they optimally produce the
same amount of products at any cartel price pc ≥ cnn−1 . Here, the only reason for suppliers
to establish a price-quota cartel is that it generates more profits than a price cartel. In
15This coordination problem is absent for pc = cn
n−1 as then all members find it optimal to produce the same
amount of products.
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particular, we know by Proposition 10 that the profit-maximizing price of a price cartel
is below the monopoly price. Implementing an optimal quota scheme allows firms to avoid
excessive production and to sustain the monopoly price, thereby increasing the collusive value.
Theorem 13. Assume production in advance, δ ≥ 1 − 1n and pm > cnn−1 . There exists a
price-quota cartel for which Vi(p
c,qc) > Vi(p
c,q∗(pc)) for all i ∈ N . An optimal price-quota
cartel contract has all firms pricing at pm and a total production of D(pm).
In conclusion, if market demand is sufficiently elastic, then a quota agreement may be
required to solve a coordination and an incentive problem. As to the latter, the price-quota
cartel ceteris paribus leads to a convergence of market shares. By contrast, when market
demand is sufficiently inelastic, the sole reason for establishing an additional quota agreement
is that it allows the cartel to sustain a higher price while reducing costs due to overproduction.
As cnn−1 is decreasing in n, the latter situation is more likely the larger the number of firms in
the industry. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this implies that the coordination problem
may be more pronounced the fewer the number of cartel participants, all else equal.
6 Production to Order
Let us now consider the case where production is in response to specific buyer requests. The
fundamental difference with the previous analysis lies in the way in which firms’ demand
is determined. With production to order, producers simultaneously choose a price and a
quantity they are willing to supply at that price. Unlike with production in advance, there is
no commitment to a particular production level ex ante as demand is realized before actual
production takes place. Consequently, the allocation of customers when two or more firms
charge the same price does not depend on produced quantities. In this case, we use α to
describe a firm’s share of market demand. Specifically, if all suppliers charge the same price
and total supply does not fall short of market demand at that price, then αi is the (exogenously
given) market share of firm i.
Firm i’s demand, absent any quota agreement, is therefore of the following structure:
Di(pi,p−i) =
{
αi∑
j∈Ω(pi) αj
if pi ≤ pj for all j ∈ N\{i}
0 otherwise.
Firm i’s profits are then given by
pii(pi,p−i) = (pi − c)Di(pi,p−i).
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6.1 Static Nash Equilibrium
In this setting, firms de facto compete in price to attract orders. As there are no capacity
constraints, we obtain the well-known result that firms optimally price at marginal cost and
produce to meet demand at that price. That is, akin to the Bertrand paradox, there exists a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which (at least two) firms price at c. There is no other Nash
equilibrium in which one or more suppliers make a positive profit. Consequently, stationary
profits are zero when firms produce to order. This provides a strong incentive for firms to
engage in a cartel. But what (type of) cartel contract is most likely to be formed? It is this
issue that we address in the next subsection.
6.2 Collusion
If firms form a price cartel by fixing prices at pc > c, then firm i faces a demand of αiD(p
c).
As pc > c, it is an optimal strategy for every member to produce up to its demand. Thus,
the collusive value for firm i is recursively defined by
Vi(p
c) = (pc − c)αiD(pc) + δVi(pc),
which is equivalent to
Vi(p
c) =
(pc − c)αiD(pc)
1− δ .
As with production in advance, optimal defection profits amount to (pc − c)D(pc). Cartel
members therefore face the following incentive compatibility constraint:
δ ≥ δ∗i = 1− αi, for all i ∈ N.
As before, sustainability of collusion requires δ ≥ 1 − 1n , which is obtained with an equal
division of sales. Yet, unlike with production in advance, a price cartel will not face a co-
ordination problem. Also, the incentive constraint is independent of the elasticity of market
demand. In fact, given that δ ≥ 1− 1n , whether or not price collusion is viable solely depends
on the size distribution of cartel participants. Specifically, feasibility of collusion requires the
market share of the smallest cartel member(s) to be sufficiently large. As the critical discount
factor is independent of the cartel price, the cartel will optimally set the monopoly price, i.e.,
pc = pm. The next result therefore closely resembles Theorem 12 above.
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Theorem 14. Assume production to order and δ ≥ 1− 1n .
(i) If 1− 1n ≤ δ < 1− αi∑j∈N αj for some firm i ∈ N , then there exists only a viable price-quota
cartel, and
(ii) If 1 − αi∑
j∈N αj
≤ δ for all i ∈ N , then there exists both a viable price cartel and a
price-quota cartel.
When firms produce to order, a price cartel and a price-quota cartel are equally profitable
as in both cases the cartel mimics a multi-plant monopolist. Consequently, the only reason
for firms to adopt a market sharing scheme is that without such an arrangement collusion
may not be sustainable. In particular, the cartel may have to agree on a redistribution of sales
from the larger to the smaller members.16 There are several ways in which firms can arrange
a more equal division of sales. For example, larger firms may simply refuse to serve part of
their demand so as to increase the residual demand for the products of smaller members.
Alternatively, the cartel may adopt a more sophisticated system of end-of-the-year buy backs
to ensure that every member meets its pre-arranged output level. It is noteworthy that such
agreements have been observed several times in antitrust practice.17
7 Discussion
The above analysis has been conducted under several assumptions, some of which we believe
warrant some discussion. In the following, we relate our work to literature that considers
settings with cost heterogeneity, demand uncertainty and private information. Moreover, we
discuss the extent to which our results are robust to the possibility of holding inventories.
7.1 Cost Asymmetries, Demand Uncertainty and Private Information
By studying collusion in a price-quantity oligopoly, our analysis sheds some light on what
type of cartel we may expect in particular type of industries. Our findings suggest that we
often may expect firms to agree on both prices and quantities, albeit for various reasons.
We have derived results in a setting where both prices and quantities are public information
and firms have accurate knowledge about cost and demand functions. Clearly, relaxing one
16In this paper, we derive results for a given cartel size. Alternatively, when cartel formation is assumed
endogenous, it may be more optimal for the larger firms to form a less than all-inclusive cartel leaving out the
smaller firms. This possibility is analyzed in Bos and Harrington (2010).
17See, for example, Harrington (2006).
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or more of these assumptions may provide alternative explanations for when to expect firms
to establish a price-quota cartel. Existing literature has offered various rationales for full
collusion in the presence of cost and demand shocks and in case strategic choice variables are
private information. Here, we briefly discuss this related literature.
Let us first discuss the possibility of cost heterogeneity. In our setting, differences in firm
size are unrelated to differences in unit costs. Consequently, a market-sharing scheme when
implemented is also not driven by efficiency considerations. This is unlikely to hold in general
as differences in unit costs may give rise to asymmetric incentive schemes. For instance, one
may conjecture a cartel to allocate a relatively large market share to more efficient members
as these have more to gain from defection and less to fear from retaliation.18 In this respect,
Harrington (1991) shows that whether or not an optimal market sharing rule is sensitive to
cost differences in part depends on the level of the discount factor. Specifically, the market
sharing rule is independent of firms’ unit costs when the discount factor is relatively low, but
not when firms are sufficiently patient.
The potential impact of cost heterogeneity on collusion has also been analyzed in a setting
of fluctuating demand conditions. Choi, Menezes and Tressler (1985), for example, consider
a static framework in which firms negotiate price and market shares to establish an efficient
cartel agreement. Assuming cost heterogeneity and demand uncertainty, the prediction is
that the cartel arrangement includes averaging of unit production costs. Moreover, this study
predicts a convergence of market shares when market demand declines. The reason being
that the small firms (i.e., high cost firms) must earn sufficient profits for the cartel to remain
effective. Alternatively, firms may engage in involuntary periodic price wars to sustain collu-
sion. Indeed, as Green and Porter (1984) predicts, a temporary breakdown in prices may be
required to maintain a collusive scheme when demand conditions are fluctuating and firms’
quantities are private information.
Market share schemes potentially also play an important role when production costs are
not publicly known. As Athey and Bagwell (2001) points out, market share agreements may
allow producers to collude perfectly when they experience privately observed cost shocks in
each period. By exchanging future market share favors efficiently, first-best profits can be
attained when firms are sufficiently patient. Such a rather sophisticated price-quota cartel
18Note that sustainability of collusion with differences in unit costs may also require a more equal division
of sales, because efficient firms have more to gain from a cartel.
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is preferred as it induces a high cost firm to reveal its identity, thereby allowing the cartel
to produce efficiently. In a comparable setting, Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) shows
that optimal collusion may induce firms to fix both prices and market shares. In particular,
this implies that the cartel foregoes productive efficiency as low cost firms produce relatively
too little and high costs firms produce relatively too much. Yet, it is also found that when
firms are sufficiently impatient, effectiveness of collusion may require low cost firms to set a
lower price in order to gain more market share.
A couple of recent studies has considered collusion in a setting where prices or quantities
are private information. Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007) shows that when prices are not
publicly observable (but firms’ quantities are), then the mere threat of (symmetric) price
wars may be insufficient to sustain collusion. Yet, collusion may be sustainable through
an asymmetric punishment scheme that prescribes firms that sold in excess of their quota
to compensate those members that sold under quota. In a similar fashion, Harrington and
Skrzypacz (2010) shows that firms with high sales may have an incentive to compensate mem-
bers with low sales to sustain collusion in an environment where both prices and quantities
are private information. That firms do not need much information to collude effectively has
been recently confirmed by Ho¨rner and Jamison (2007). This study finds that firms require
hardly any information to collude almost perfectly. However, to obtain this result, firms need
to agree on both prices and market shares.
The studies mentioned above reveal that there are distinct possibilities for price-fixing
firms to benefit from a market sharing scheme. In this respect, our findings are complemen-
tary and suggest that price-quota cartels are likely to be the rule. Put differently, even in
a world where cost and demand are known and stable and actions are publicly observable,
firms often benefit from a market sharing agreement.
7.2 Strategic Inventories
The analysis in this paper has been conducted under the assumption that firms do not build
inventories (Assumption 6). We now evaluate the extent to which our main findings are ro-
bust to the possibility that suppliers store unsold products. To begin, a firm that produces to
order will never find it in its interest to hold inventories in our setting. Due to discounting,
it is not optimal to produce in excess of demand in the current period with the aim to sell
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these units in future periods. Moreover, as production follows the realization of demand,
overproduction does not occur “by accident”. Thus, even absent inventory costs, allowing for
inventories would not affect our results regarding production to order.
This story is somewhat more complicated when production precedes sales. Let us first
evaluate the potential impact of inventories on the nature of competition. Observe that a
firm can still guarantee itself non-negative profits by charging a sufficiently high price or by
producing nothing. Yet, in contrast to Theorem 5, expected competitive profits may no longer
be zero. To see this, suppose that suppliers do not price below c and let xi > 0 be the inven-
tory of firm i ∈ N . Now suppose that firm i produces nothing and sets pi = c. In this case,
its profit is given by cDi(c, xi,p−i,q−i), where Di(c, xi,p−i,q−i) = min{xi, xi∑
j∈Ω(c) qj
D(c)}.
Given that its rivals do not price below c (a possibility that cannot be ruled out here), it
holds that Di(c, xi,p−i,q−i) > 0. As a result, holding inventories potentially allows firms to
make positive profits in competition. This renders the analysis intractable as the static Nash
equilibrium could not even be determined explicitly absent inventories.19
Yet, as this paper is primarily concerned with collusion, the more relevant issue is how
inventories could affect our predictions of cartel behavior. As suppliers can guarantee them-
selves a non-negative profit stream in competition, allowing for inventories potentially affects
the expected punishment in response to defection. Specifically, the possibility of holding in-
ventories may yield a less severe threat point and therefore tighten the incentive compatibility
constraint, all else equal. This clearly lowers the likelihood of collusion, but does not alter
the qualitative nature of our findings. The same holds for the optimal deviating strategy,
because profits of defection are still maximized by slightly undercutting the cartel price and
supply to meet market demand at that price. That is to say, as firms in our model face
no capacity constraint there is no gain from building inventories with the aim to increase
deviating profits.20 This leaves the potential impact of inventories on firm behavior under the
cartel regime. As in the analysis above, we distinguish two cases on the basis of the elasticity
of market demand.
19To solve this problem, one needs to be able to characterize optimal intertemporal production policies. As
Van den Berg, Bos, Herings and Peters (2011) clearly illustrates, such an analysis is everything but trivial even
when firms make intertemporal supply decisions without production.
20If firms are capacity constrained, then inventories may play a vital role in sustaining collusion. In such a
setting, inventories allow for an instant and significant increase in sales following a deviation, thereby ensuring
that the punishment is effective. See Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) for an analysis and discussion of this
possibility.
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Suppose pc > cnn−1 . In this case, all members of the price cartel optimally supply
(n−1)pcD(pc)
cn2
in the first period, whereas firm demand is 1nD(p
c). As a result, all partici-
pants are left with an inventory of x = (n−1)p
cD(pc)−cnD(pc)
cn2
> 0. In the second period, every
member thus maximizes the following profit function
max
qi
pi(pc,q) =
qi + x∑
j∈N (qj + x)
pcD(pc)− cqi. (9)
This function is concave in qi and reaches its maximum at
q∗i =
√
pcD(pc)((n− 1)x+∑j∈N\{i} qj)
c
− nx−
∑
j∈N\{i}
qj , for all i ∈ N. (10)
It can be easily verified that (10) implies q∗i = q
∗
j for all i, j ∈ N and
q∗i + x =
pcD(pc)(n− 1)
cn2
, for all i ∈ N.
Therefore, if firms are allowed to hold inventories and pc > cnn−1 , then they still find it
optimal to supply identical amounts. Specifically, the possibility of storing unsold products
gives members a recurring additional profit compared to the situation without inventories.
Moreover, deviating profits are higher as part of the products have been produced in previous
periods. Therefore, if pc > cnn−1 , then the possibility of holding inventories affects collusive
and deviating profits and potentially makes the threat point less severe. We do not know
which of these effects dominates. Yet, as the situation is symmetric, the qualitative nature of
our findings remains unaltered.
Finally, suppose pc ≤ cnn−1 . In this case, members of the price cartel do not produce in
excess of demand. Therefore, allowing for inventories will not affect collusive and deviating
profits. The only thing that might change are the profits during the punishment phase, which
in fact could materially affect our results. To see this, suppose that a firm defects from the
cartel arrangement. The deviator has no inventory left, but the loyal members do as they are
suddenly confronted with zero sales in the period of defection. As a consequence, the situation
is asymmetric after the period of defection. As explained above, expected competitive profits
weakly exceed zero. Therefore, collusion is less likely to be sustainable, all else equal. However,
the more pronounced problem is that we do not know which of the members has the highest
incentive to defect. It could be the largest firm. On the one hand, this firm has less to gain
by defecting but, on the other hand, it faces a less severe punishment as its fellow members
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have less inventory. By contrast, it could be the smallest member. This firm has most to gain
from deviating, but at the same time its expected punishment is more severe as the other
firms have more inventory left.
In conclusion, firms have no incentive to build inventories for strategic reasons in our
setting. Nevertheless, producing in excess of demand can be rationalized when production
is in advance of sale. We have argued that storing these unsold products will not alter
the qualitative nature of our findings when market demand is sufficiently inelastic. The
reason is that the situation remains symmetric in this case. Allowing for inventories could
materially affect our findings when market demand is relatively elastic, because it may create
asymmetric cartel incentive schemes. It is noteworthy, however, that an additional market
sharing agreement could solve this problem. That is to say, the maximum critical discount
factor is still minimized with an equal division of sales. Therefore, our prediction that a
price-quota cartel is preferred to a price-fixing cartel when it leads to a more equal division
of sales is robust to the possibility of holding inventories, all else unchanged.
8 Concluding Remarks
Why do we observe various types of cartel contracts in antitrust practice? In this study,
we have sought to shed some light on one specific sort of cartel heterogeneity: price versus
price-quota cartels. Existing literature has shown that an additional agreement on production
levels may be needed to overcome incentive problems that arise due to imperfect information
and demand uncertainty. This paper provides an alternative explanation. In the context of
an infinitely repeated game with complete information, sustainability of collusion may still
require an agreement on sales levels. Specifically, the market share of the smallest cartel
member must be sufficiently large, which may induce firms to arrange a more equal division
of outputs. This holds when firms produce to order and when production is in advance of
sale and market demand is sufficiently elastic. As to the latter, an arrangement on outputs
may additionally help firms to solve a coordination problem. Moreover, with production in
advance, establishing an output ceiling is always profitable when market demand is sufficiently
inelastic. Consequently, there are several rationales for the existence of both price and price-
quota cartels, even in a world of certainty and perfect information.
These results have potentially important implications in light of antitrust enforcement.
23
For instance, industries with price increases in conjunction with a decline in sales volume and
converging market shares should, ceteris paribus, be considered suspect of anti-competitive
practices. Also, refusals to deal at relatively high prices in combination with relatively low
capacity utilization may indicate the presence of a cartel. However, such observations should
always be judged while taking account of the idiosyncrasies of a particular industry. Indeed,
our analysis suggests that market characteristics may play a vital role in the design of a cartel
contract. In particular, knowing when and where to expect a price-quota cartel is likely
to increase the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement as the chance of discovering physical
evidence is higher, all else equal. The reason being that, unlike with price collusion, it is
difficult to see how firms can coordinate their sales levels without communicating explicitly.
Yet, to what extent our theoretical findings are helpful in detecting cartels is ultimately an
empirical question. We leave this issue for future research.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.
(i) If all firms price above c, then there is at least one firm that finds it optimal to
undercut the lowest price slightly and serve market demand at that price. Therefore, let
M = {i ∈ N | pi = c} the set of firms that price at c, where | M |≥ 1. In this case, for
all i ∈ M , qi > Di(c, qi,p−i,q−i) gives pii < 0, whereas qi = Di(c, qi,p−i,q−i) gives pii = 0.
Thus, a firm pricing at c will not produce in excess of its demand. This implies that there
exists a firm j ∈ M for which it holds that D(c) −∑i∈M\{j} qi > 0. As a result, this firm
j can do better by charging a higher price and produce to meet its residual demand at that
price. Hence, there exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
(ii) In our setting, the strategy space A is compact and the game is symmetric. There-
fore we can apply Corollary 5.3 of Reny (1999). According to this corollary, there exists a
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in our game if its mixed extension is diagonally payoff
secure and each pii(µ, ..., µ) is upper semicontinuous as a function of µ on P (A). Here, P (A)
is the space of all (Borel) probability measures on A endowed with the weak topology.
• Upper semicontinuity: To proof that each pii(µ, ..., µ) is upper semicontinuous as a
function of µ on P (A), we have to show that lim suppii(µ
t, ..., µt) ≤ pii(µ, ..., µ) when-
ever limt→∞ µt = µ. This is equivalent to showing that every converging subsequence
has a limit that is smaller or equal to pii(µ, ..., µ). Therefore, assume w.l.o.g. that
limt→∞ pii(µt, ..., µt) = y and let x = pii(µ, ..., µ). Since
∑
i∈N pii is continuous and all
firms play the same strategy in a symmetric game, it holds that ny = limt→∞
∑
i∈N pii(µ
t, ..., µt) =∑
i∈N pii(µ, ..., µ) = nx. Therefore, x = y and limt→∞ pii(µ
t, ..., µt) = pii(µ, ..., µ). This
implies that each pii(µ, ..., µ) is not only upper semicontinuous as a function of µ on
P (A), but continuous as well.
• Diagonally payoff secure: To proof that our setting is diagonally payoff secure, we
have to show that for every µ ∈ P (A) and every ε > 0, each firm i can secure a
payoff pii(µ, ..., µ) − ε along the diagonal at (µ, ..., µ). Firm i can secure a payoff of
pii(µ, ..., µ) − ε along the diagonal at (µ, ..., µ) if there exists a µ¯ ∈ P (A) such that
pii(µ
′, ..., µ¯, ..., µ′) ≥ pii(µ, ..., µ)− ε for all µ′ in some open neighborhood of µ ∈ P (A).
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Now, for every δ > 0 and every Borel subset B of A define
Bδ := {(p′, q) ∈ A | there is (p, q) ∈ B such that p′ = p+ δ}.
For a mixed strategy µ on A define the mixed strategy µδ by
µδ(B) := µ(Bδ) + µ({(p, q) ∈ B | p < δ})
for every Borel set B. Finally, let ε > 0 and let µ be a mixed strategy on A. Then
there is a δ > 0 such that ui(µ
′, . . . , µ′, µδ, µ′, . . . , µ′) ≥ ui(µ, . . . , µ) − ε for all µ′ close
enough to µ. This last line follows because, given that the other firms do not change
their mixed strategies too much, if firm i slightly lowers its price, this at most slightly
reduces its profit. 
Proof of Lemma 3. We prove that s(pˇ) = {D(pˇ)} by deriving a contradiction. In our
game, the support is compact and therefore s(pˇ) 6= ∅.
First, we will show that for all p ∈ [pˇ, pm], it holds that q ≤ D(p) for all q ∈ s(p). Define
Bε(p, q) as the open ε-ball centered at (p, q). Assume q > D(p) and let ε > 0 be small enough,
such that for all (pi, qi) ∈ Bε(p, q) it holds that qi > D(pi). Let (p˜, q˜) be an arbitrary element
in Bε(p, q). Then, given any (p−i, q−i), the actions chosen by the other n− 1 firms, firm i’s
profit is
pii(p˜, q˜,p−i, q−i) = p˜
q˜∑
j∈Ω(p˜) qj
(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆(p˜)
qk)
+ − cq˜.
Instead, if firm i would choose the action (p˜ − δ,D(p˜ − δ)), where δ > 0 is chosen such that
D(p˜− δ) < q˜ and δD(p˜) < c(q˜ −D(p˜− δ)), its profit is
pii(p˜− δ,D(p˜− δ),p−i, q−i) = (p˜− δ) q˜∑
j∈Ω(p˜−δ) qj
(D(p˜− δ)−
∑
k∈∆(p˜−δ)
qk)
+− cD(p˜− δ).
Note that sinceD(p˜−δ) < q˜, it holds that if (D(p˜)−∑k∈∆(p˜) qk)+ = 0, then (p˜−δ,D(p˜−δ))
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is a strict improvement over (p˜, q˜). Now, if (D(p˜)−∑k∈∆(p˜) qk)+ > 0, then
pii(p˜− δ,D(p˜− δ),p−i, q−i) > (p˜− δ)(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆(p˜)
qk)− cD(p˜− δ)
> (p˜− δ)(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆(p˜)
qk) + δD(p˜)− cq˜
= p˜(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆(p˜)
qk)− cq˜ + δ
∑
k∈∆(p˜)
qk
≥ p˜(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆(p˜)
qk)− cq˜
≥ p˜ q˜∑
j∈Ω(p˜) qj
(D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆(p˜)
qk)− cq˜
= pii(p˜, q˜,p−i, q−i).
Here, the first inequality holds because of the following. First, note that Ω(p˜ − δ)\{i} ∪
∆(p˜− δ) ⊆ ∆(p˜), Ω(p˜− δ)\{i} ∩∆(p˜− δ) = ∅ and D(p˜− δ) > D(p˜). This gives
D(p˜)−
∑
k∈∆(p˜)
qk < D(p˜− δ)−
∑
k∈∆(p˜−δ)
qk −
∑
j∈Ω(p˜−δ)\{i}
qj
≤ q˜∑
j∈Ω(p˜−δ) qj
(D(p˜− δ)−
∑
k∈∆(p˜−δ)
qk).
The second inequality follows from δD(p˜) < c(q˜ −D(p˜ − δ)). So, also when the residual
demand is strictly positive, the action (p˜ − δ,D(p˜ − δ)) gives a strictly higher profit then
(p˜, q˜). This implies that, for any (p˜, q˜) ∈ Bε(p, q), there exists a δ such that it holds that
(p˜− δ,D(p˜− δ)) gives a strictly higher payoff and therefore q /∈ s(p).
Next, assume that q ∈ s(pˇ) and q < D(pˇ). The maximum profit that a firm can make in
any point in an open ε-ball centered at (pˇ, q) is strictly smaller than (pˇ+ ε− c)(q + ε). Since
(pˇ− c)D(pˇ) > (pˇ− c)q, as ε→ 0, there always exists a η > 0 such that
(pˇ− η − c)D(pˇ− η) > (pˇ+ ε− c)(q + ε).
That is, there always exists a price-quantity combination (pˇ − η,D(pˇ − η)) that gives a
strictly higher profit than any point in Bε(pˇ, q). This contradicts q ∈ s(pˇ). Thus, we conclude
s(pˇ) = {D(pˇ)}.
Suppose there is an atom at price pˇ. In that case, pii((pˇ, D(pˇ)),µ−i) < (pˇ − c)D(pˇ). This
implies that there exists a small enough δ > 0 such that
pii((pˇ− δ,D(pˇ− δ)),µ−i) = (pˇ− δ − c)D(pˇ− δ)
> pii((pˇ, D(pˇ)),µ−i).
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This implies that µp does not have an atom at pˇ. 
Proof of Lemma 4. First observe that Lemma 3 implies pˇ < pm, because otherwise
pˇ = pm = pˆ and µ({pˇ}) > 0. Next, we will show that there exists a price p′ ∈ (pˇ, pm] for
which s(p′) = {D(p′)}. In the proof of Lemma 3, it is shown that for any p ∈ [pˇ, pm], it
holds for all q > D(p) that q /∈ s(p). Therefore, given that all n − 1 rivals stick to their
equilibrium strategy, firm i’s profit of choosing (p, q) ∈ supp(µ), is as follows. The expected
residual demand of firm i, when m ≥ 1 firms price below, l firms price at the same price and
n−m− l − 1 price above the price of firm i, is given by
A((p, q),µ−i) =
(
n−1∑
m=1
n−1−m∑
l=0
∫
([pˇ,p)×[0,D(c)])m×({p}×[0,D(c)])l
min{q, q∑
j∈Ω(p) qj
(D(p)−
∑
k∈∆(p)
qk)
+}d(
m+l∏
j=1
µ(pj , qj))
× (n− 1)!
(n− 1−m)!m! ×
(n− 1−m)!
(n− 1−m− l)!l!
)
× (µp((p, pˆ]))n−m−l−1.
The expected residual demand of firm i, when l ≥ 1 firms price at the same price and n− l−1
firms price above the price of firm i, is given by
B((p, q),µ−i) =
(
n−1∑
l=1
∫
({p}×[0,D(c)]l
min{q, q∑
j∈Ω(p) qj
D(p)}d(
l∏
j=1
µ(pj , qj))
× (n− 1)!
(n− 1− l)!l!
)
× (µp((p, pˆ]))n−l−1.
Therefore, firm i’s expected profit of choosing (p, q) ∈ supp(µ) is
pii((p, q),µ−i) = p×A((p, q),µ−i) + p×B((p, q),µ−i) (11)
+pq(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1 − cq.
Both A((p, q),µ−i) and B((p, q),µ−i) are increasing in q for q ≤ D(p). Hence, pii((p, q),µ−i)
is strictly increasing in q when p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1 − c > 0.
Since there are at most countably many atoms in µp, pˇ > c and µp({pˇ}) = 0 (Lemma 3),
there exists a p′ ∈ (pˇ, pm] such that p(µp((p, pˆ]))n−1 − c > 0 for all p ∈ (pˇ, p′] and s(p′) 6= ∅.
We now show that s(p) = {D(p)} or s(p) = ∅ for all p ∈ (pˇ, p′]. Assume p ∈ (pˇ, p′], q ∈ s(p)
and q < D(p). Define Bε(p, q) as the open ε-ball centered at (p, q) and let ε > 0 be small
enough, such that for all (pi, qi) ∈ Bε(p, q) it holds that qi < D(pi), pi(µp((pi, pˆ]))n−1 − c > 0
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and pi > pˇ. Let (p˜, q˜) be an arbitrary element in Bε(p, q). Then, since the profit of firm i
is increasing in q for q ≤ D(p), firm i strictly improves its profits by choosing (p˜, D(p˜)).
Therefore, for any (p˜, q˜) ∈ Bε(p, q) there is another combination of price and quantity that
will give a strictly higher payoff and therefore q /∈ s(p). In the proof of Lemma 3, it is shown
that for all q ∈ s(p) it holds that q ≤ D(p). This gives s(p) = {D(p)} or s(p) = ∅ for all
p ∈ (pˇ, p′]. Since s(p′) 6= ∅, it holds that s(p′) = {D(p′)}.
Now suppose that µp has an atom at some price p ∈ (pˇ, p′]. The measure µp has at
most countably many atoms, which implies that there exists a small enough δ > 0 such that
p− δ > pˇ, µp({p− δ}) = 0 and
pii((p− δ,D(p− δ)),µ−i) = (p− δ)D(p− δ)µp((p− δ, pˆ]))n−1 − cD(p− δ)
≥ (p− δ)D(p− δ)µp([p, pˆ]))n−1 − cD(p− δ)
> pD(p)
( n−1∑
l=0
1
n− lµp({p})
n−1−lµ((p, pˆ])l × (n− 1)!
(n− 1− l)!l!
)
− cD(p)
= pii((p,D(p)),µ−i).
In the third line, l represents the number of firms that price at the same level as firm i. Since
there is an atom at p, the probability of l being strictly positive is strictly bigger than 0,
hence the inequality before the third line. Consequently, µp cannot have an atom at any price
p ∈ (pˇ, p′].
Finally, we show that s(p) = {D(p)} for all p ∈ (pˇ, p′]. Assume that s(p) = ∅ for all p in
some interval (α, β) ⊆ (pˇ, p′). This implies that, for p ∈ (α, β),
pii((p,D(p)),µ−i) = pD(p)(µp([β, pˆ]))n−1 − cD(p).
It follows from β ≤ pm and D′(p)(p− c) +D(p) > 0 for all p ∈ (α, β), that pii((p,D(p)),µ−i)
is strictly increasing for all p ∈ (α, β).
Now, the maximum profit that a firm can make in any point in an open ε-ball cen-
tered at (α,D(α)) is strictly smaller than (α + ε)D(α + ε)µp((α − ε, pˇ]) − cD(α + ε). Since
pii((p,D(p)),µ−i) is strictly increasing for all p ∈ (α, β) and µp does not have an atom at any
price p ∈ (pˇ, p′], as ε→ 0, there always exists γ ∈ (α, β) such that
pii((γ,D(γ)),µ−i) > (α+ ε)D(α+ ε)µp((α− ε, pˇ])− cD(α+ ε).
That is, there always exists a price-quantity combination (γ,D(γ)) that gives a strictly higher
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profit than any point in Bε(α,D(α)). This contradicts (α,D(α)) ∈ supp(µ). Thus, we con-
clude that s(p) = {D(p)} for all p ∈ (pˇ, p′]. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Suppose pˇ > c and let pu = sup{p′ ∈ [pˇ, pm] | ∀p ∈ [pˇ, p′) : s(p) =
{D(p)} and µp({p}) = 0}. From Lemma 4 it follows that pu > pˇ. Moreover, since the support
of a measure is closed, D(pu) ∈ s(pu).
Since µp({p}) = 0 for all p ∈ [pˇ, pu), it follows directly from the proof of Lemma 4 that
pi∗ = D(p)[p(µp((p, pˆ]))n−1 − c] for all p ∈ [pˇ, pu). As pi∗ ≥ 0, it follows that
pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1 − c = lim
p↑pu
p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1 − c
≥ 0.
Hence, there are two possibilities. Either pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1−c = 0 or pu(µp([pu, pˆ]))n−1−c >
0.
Suppose that pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1 − c = 0. Then it follows from µ({p}) = 0 for all p ∈ [pˇ, pu)
that
pi∗ = lim
p↑pu
D(p)[p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1 − c]
= D(pu)[pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1 − c]
= 0.
This implies that p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1 − c = 0 for all p ∈ [pˇ, pu). Since µ({pˇ}) = 0, it follows that
(µp((pˇ, pˆ]))
n−1 = 1 and therefore pˇ = c.
Now suppose that pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1−c > 0. If this is the case, it must hold that µp({pu}) > 0.
Suppose the contrary, i.e. µp({pu}) = 0. Then there exists a p˜ > pu for which it holds that
p˜(µp((p˜, pˆ]))
n−1 − c > 0. From the proof of Lemma 4 it follows that s(p) = {D(p)} and
µp({p}) = 0 for all p ∈ [pˇ, p˜). This contradicts the definition of pu. Hence, µp({pu}) > 0.
Given that µp({pu}) > 0, for every q < D(pu), there exists a δ > 0 such that
pii((p
u, q),µ−i) ≤ q[pu(µp([pu, pˆ]))n−1 − c]
< D(pu − δ)[(pu − δ)(µp((pu − δ, pˆ]))n−1 − c]
= pii((p
u − δ,D(pu − δ)),µ−i)
= pi∗.
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The first inequality follows since firm i sells at most q. Since q < D(pu) and limp↑pu D(p)[p(µp((p, pˆ]))n−1−
c] = D(pu)[pu(µp([p
u, pˆ]))n−1 − c], the second inequality is strict for a small enough δ.
Now, for q = D(pu) it holds for all 0 < δ ≤ pu − pˇ that
pii((p
u, D(pu)),µ−i) < D(pu)[pu(µp([pu, pˆ]))n−1 − c]
= lim
p↑pu
D(p)[p(µp((p, pˆ]))
n−1 − c]
= D(pu − δ)[(pu − δ)(µp((pu − δ, pˆ]))n−1 − c]
= pi∗.
Since there is an atom at pu, firm i expects to sell strictly less than D(pu) when it sets a price
of pu. Hence, the first inequality is strict and the equalities follow immediately.
So, given that µp({pu}) > 0, for any combination (pu, q) there exists a δ > 0 such that it
holds that (pu − δ,D(pu − δ)) gives a strictly higher payoff. Therefore, this second situation
cannot occur. Thus, we conclude that pˇ = c and pi∗ = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 7. As we consider a price cartel, firms are free in choosing their production
levels. Therefore, it is sufficient to analyze the impact of output decisions on per-period profits.
Given a fixed cartel price pc ∈ (c, pm], per-period profit for every firm i ∈ N is
pici (p
c,q) = pcDi(p
c,q)− cqi,
where firm demand is given by
Di(p
c,q) =
{
qi if
∑
j∈N qj ≤ D(pc)
qi∑
j∈N qj
D(pc) if
∑
j∈N qj > D(p
c).
The following first-order condition specifies the impact of a change in the level of individual
production on per-period profit.
dpici (p
c,q)
dqi
=
p
c − c if qi ≤ D(pc)−
∑
j∈N\{i} qj
pc
∑
j∈N\{i} qj
(
∑
j∈N qj)2
D(pc)− c if qi > D(pc)−
∑
j∈N\{i} qj .
Hence, as pc > c, the profit of firm i is increasing in its production level as long as qi ≤
D(pc)−∑j∈N\{i} qj . Yet, profits may increase even more for output levels that make aggregate
supply exceed market demand. This requires
pc
∑
j∈N\{i} qj
(
∑
j∈N qj)2
D(pc)− c ≥ 0,
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or
qi ≤
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} qj)
c
−
∑
j∈N\{i}
qj .
Therefore, this case applies when there exists a production level qi for which the following
condition is satisfied
D(pc)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
qj < qi ≤
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} qj)
c
−
∑
j∈N\{i}
qj .
This is possible if and only if
∑
j∈N\{i}
qj >
D(pc)c
pc
.
Thus, we can conclude that q∗i (p
c,q−i) = D(pc)−
∑
j∈N\{i} qj if
∑
j∈N\{i} qj ≤ D(p
c)c
pc . More-
over, if
∑
j∈N\{i} qj >
D(pc)c
pc , then q
∗
i (p
c,q−i) =
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} qj)
c −
∑
j∈N\{i} qj provided
that this yields more profit than with zero production. Producing nothing is strictly preferred
when the following two equations hold simultaneously:
D(pc)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
qj < 0, (12)
and
pc
∑
j∈N\{i} qj
(
∑
j∈N qj)2
D(pc)− c < 0. (13)
If qi = 0, then
∑
j∈N qj =
∑
j∈N\{i} qj . Substituting in (13) and rearranging gives∑
j∈N\{i}
qj >
D(pc)pc
c
. (14)
Notice that (14) implies (12). Hence, (14) is a sufficient condition under which firm i finds it
optimal to produce nothing. We therefore conclude that q∗i (p
c,q−i) =
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} qj)
c −∑
j∈N\{i} qj if
D(pc)c
pc <
∑
j∈N\{i} qj ≤ D(p
c)pc
c and q
∗
i (p
c,q−i) = 0 if
∑
j∈N\{i} qj >
D(pc)pc
c . 
Proof of Lemma 8. Let m =
∑
k∈N\{v,w} qk. Hence,
q∗v =
√
pcD(pc)(m+ q∗w)
c
− (m+ q∗w),
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and
q∗w =
√
pcD(pc)(m+ q∗v)
c
− (m+ q∗v).
Substituting q∗w in q∗v yields
4q∗2v + (4m−
pcD(pc)
c
)q∗v −m(
pcD(pc)
c
−m) = 0.
Solving for q∗v gives
q∗v =
−(4m− pcD(pc)
c
)±
√
pcD(pc)
c
(8m+
pcD(pc)
c
)
8 .
There is a unique solution for which q∗v > 0. As we have a similar expression for q∗w, we
conclude q∗v = q∗w. 
Proof of Theorem 9. For a given cartel price pc, a cartel contract (pc,q) is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium when none of the firms has an incentive to change its production level
given the output of rivals. There are two possibilities. For all i ∈ N , either (i) ∑j∈N\{i} qj ≤
D(pc)c/pc, or (ii) D(pc)c/pc <
∑
j∈N\{i} qj ≤ D(pc)pc/c.
(i) By Lemma 7, it holds that q∗i (p
c,q−i) = D(pc) −
∑
j∈N\{i} qj for all i ∈ N . As
D(pc)−∑j∈N\{i} qj ≥ D(pc)− D(pc)cpc , it follows that q∗i (pc,q−i) ≥ pc−cpc D(pc).
In turn, this implies
n
pc − c
pc
D(pc) ≤ D(pc).
Rearranging gives
pc ≤ cn
n− 1 .
(ii) By Lemma 7, it holds that q∗i (p
c,q−i) =
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} qj)
c −
∑
j∈N\{i} qj for all
i ∈ N . In this case, we know by Lemma 8 that all firms produce the same quantity. Therefore,
q∗i (p
c,q−i) =
√
pcD(pc)(
∑
j∈N\{i} qj)
c
−
∑
j∈N\{i}
qj =
√
pcD(pc)(n− 1)q∗i (pc,q−i)
c
−(n−1)q∗i (pc,q−i).
Rearranging gives
q∗i (p
c,q−i) =
pcD(pc)(n− 1)
cn2
.
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As D(pc)c/pc <
∑
j∈N\{i} qj , it follows that (n− 1)q∗i = p
c(n−1)2D(pc)
cn2
> D(pc)c/pc.
Rearranging gives
pc >
cn
n− 1 .
Finally, it should also hold that (n− 1)q∗i ≤ D(pc)pc/c, which is true as (n−1)
2
n2
< 1. 
Proof of Theorem 12. If pm ≤ cnn−1 , then pc ≤ cnn−1 . By Theorem 9, q∗i = D(pc) −∑
j∈N/i q
∗
j . In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint is given by
δ ≥ δ∗i = 1−
q∗i∑
j∈N q
∗
j
, for all i ∈ N.
Hence, the critical discount factor is highest for the firm(s) with the lowest level of sales.
Clearly, if δ ≥ δ∗i for all i ∈ N , then there exists both a viable price cartel and a price-quota
cartel. If 1− 1n ≤ δ < 1−
q∗i∑
j∈N q
∗
j
for some firm i ∈ N , then a price cartel is not viable. In this
case, the cartel is only viable when a sufficiently large share of market demand is allocated to
the smallest cartel member(s). There exists an allocation of sales for which the price-quota
cartel is viable, because δ ≥ 1− 1n . 
Proof of Theorem 13. If pm > cnn−1 , then p
c < pm and q∗i =
(n−1)pcD(pc)
cn2
for all i ∈ N .
Moreover,
∑
i∈N q
∗
i ≥ D(pc). The collusive value of every member of a price cartel is then
given by Vi(p
c,q∗) =
q∗i∑
i∈N q∗i
(pcD(pc)−c∑i∈N q∗i )
1−δ . Clearly, keeping the cartel price and market
shares fixed, eliminating all excess supply increases the collusive value of every member. This
would yield a situation in which all firms produce D(p
c)
n and the market clears. In this case,
firms optimally set the monopoly price, which is sustainable as δ ≥ 1− 1n by assumption. 
Proof of Theorem 14. See proof of Theorem 12. 
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